Silent Coordination: Reputation, Signaling and Collusion Windows in the Global Semiconductor Logistics Industry
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The research aims to analyse the impact of strategic signalling, artificial intelligence-driven decision-making systems, and regulatory uncertainty on tacit coordination within oligopolistic markets. With technological development, firms can coordinate effectively through observable signalling and automated actions without direct communication. Therefore, to tackle the problem, the paper develops a Dynamic Stackelberg Collusion Model that integrates theories of Stackelberg competition, Bayesian beliefs, regime switches, reputation dynamics, enforcement signals, and the probability of tacit collusion. Within this model, it is proposed that strategic signalling from leading firms, reputation, market concentration, Bayesian reasoning, and pricing automation systems considerably affect the probability of tacit coordination. The results of this research demonstrate how strategic interactions have become increasingly sophisticated in today's highly technological and competitive oligopoly, with simultaneous influences from innovation, AI, market concentration, and regulation on industry participants. The semiconductor logistics industry seems to be an appropriate example for analysing strategic interaction in modern markets, since it involves high entry barriers, substantial investment, and a high degree of operational digitalisation. The research has shown that phenomena such as strategic signalling, reputation formation, Bayesian games, and AI pricing mechanisms may affect the tacit coordination of market players even without explicit collusion agreements. In addition, dynamic changes in market conditions, especially during disruptive times, are important in shaping strategic decisions and coordinating firms' incentives.
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